Abstract. We consider a framework where two agents are participating in a tournament We find that, when choosing the disclosure policy, the principal faces a tradeoff between intermediate and final effort. The disclosure policy that resolves this tradeoff in the optimal way includes two public announcements: one is made if both agents do poorly, and the other one otherwise. Consequently, both the policy of full disclosure and the policy of no disclosure are suboptimal.
Introduction
Promotion tournaments have been extensively analyzed by economists, starting from Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) . This is not surprising, since such tournaments are often used in practice. Most of the existing tournament models are static, in the sense that they assume that the winner is determined by how well the participants complete a single task. However, one might imagine a situation where the principal can make the tournament participants complete not one, but several tasks sequentially, and let the winner be determined based on the completion of all tasks.
In such a dynamic tournament, besides optimally determining the prizes, the principal has an additional instrument to affect the effort levels of the participants, namely, information disclosure. To be precise, suppose that a participant does not observe how well his competitors (or possibly even himself) have completed the intermediate tasks, but the principal does. Then the principal has the choice of how much information about the intermediate results to disclose back to the participants. For example, he might disclose no information at all (and thus make the dynamic tournament equivalent to a static one); he might tell each participant exactly how well he and his competitors have fulfilled the intermediate tasks; or he might choose some intermediate level of information disclosure, pooling the information or even introducing some stochastic noise. The choice of how much information to disclose will clearly have an effect on the participants' incentives. If the information on how successful everyone has been so far is revealed in the middle of the tournament, it will affect the participants' future effort incentives. Also, if a participant knows that he can affect the information being disclosed by his early efforts, he will take this into account at the beginning of the tournament. After the intermediate stage, the principal, but not the contestants, gets to observe the results and can disclose a public signal that transmits some information about the results back to the contestants. After observing the signal, the contestants update their beliefs accordingly and choose the final-stage effort levels. The winner is determined as the participant who gets the highest total number of successes.
First, we compare the disclosure policies that are symmetric (it treats the agents the same way) and deterministic (the announcement depends deterministically on the intermediate results). Both restrictions are likely to be satisfied by disclosure policies used in practice.
We find that the optimal disclosure policy in this class takes a simple form: the principal only tells the agents whether it is the case that both of them have failed at the intermediate stage. We proceed by analyzing all feasible disclosure policies, not necessarily symmetric or deterministic. We solve the principal's optimization problem numerically and compare the resulting maximal total effort to the total effort generated by the optimal symmetric deterministic policy. Our results indicate that the latter policy remains optimal among all feasible disclosure policies.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal effort choice given any disclosure policy. Section 4 analyzes the optimal choice of a disclosure policy. Section 5 presents a discussion of related literature and possible extensions of the model. All proofs are given in Appendix 1 and omitted in the text. Formally, the game proceeds as follows:
1) The principal publicly announces a disclosure policy (Z, ζ) , where Z is the set of signals, and ζ : Y → ∆ (Z);
2) The agents simultaneously choose intermediate effort levels e I i ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ {A, B} , and pay cost of effort c
3) Intermediate outputs y i ∈ {s, f } , i ∈ {A, B} , are realized according to
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter;
4) The principal observes (y A , y B ) and sends a public signal z, randomizing according to
5) Agents simultaneously choose final effort levels e F i (z) ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ {A, B} , and pay cost of effort c ¡ e F i (z)
6) Final outputs Y i ∈ {s, f} , i ∈ {A, B} , are realized according to
7) The winner is determined as the agent who has the highest total number of successes.
If the number of successes is equal for the two agents, agent A is considered the winner with probability 1 2 . The winning agent i gets the prize, which is worth 1 to both agents. Let ζ y A ,y B denote the probability distribution function of ζ (y A , y B ). The expected payoff of the winning agent i is
and the expected payoff of the losing agent j is
where
It is implicit in the definition of U w and U l that both agents are risk neutral. These expressions simply represents the reward of an agent net of his expected cost of effort. The principal is also assumed to be risk neutral and her payoff is the expected level of aggregate effort by both agents, i.e.,
This completes the description of our model. We now introduce the equilibrium notion that we will be using in our analysis.
2.2. The Equilibrium. We use perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as an equilibrium concept. In this game, such an equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1.
A pair of strategies for the agents,
together with a disclosure policy (Z, ζ) constitute an equilibrium, if (a) For each i ∈ {A, B} , the effort levels
where the probability that agent A wins conditional on signal z ∈ Z is
and
The strategy of the principal is to choose a disclosure policy, while the agents' strategy has two elements: a choice of intermediate effort level, and a choice of final effort level given the realized signal. A three-tuple of strategies by the principal and the two agent is said to constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is this game if two conditions are satisfied -first, each agent's effort choices must maximize his expected payoff given the disclosure policy, and the strategy of the other agent; second, given the strategies of the two agents, the principal's choice of disclosure policy must maximize his expected payoff.
In the following two sections we will characterize the strategies of the agents and the principal that satisfies these two conditions. We start with the characterization of the optimal effort by the agents for a given disclosure policy.
Optimal Effort
For every z ∈ Z, let P y i ,y j (z) = Pr ((y A , y B ) |z) denote the posterior probability of intermediate outcome (y i , y j ) conditional on signal z being observed. Thus
and P z sf , P z fs and P z ff are determined in a similar fashion. Without loss of generality, we will consider only signals for which the denominator is nonzero.
At the final stage, after observing a signal z ∈ Z, the winning probability for agent A is determined by equation 1, so if the constraints e F i (z) ∈ [0, 1] , ∀z ∈ Z, i ∈ {A, B}, do not bind, then the first-order conditions are:
The second-order conditions hold for both agents, because Pr (i wins|z) is linear in e F i (z) and the cost of effort is convex. It follows that if the constraints e F i (z) ∈ [0, 1] , ∀z ∈ Z, i ∈ {A, B}, do not bind, then the equilibrium final-stage effort is the ones that solve (2). Here, we will write the solution denote the solutions as:
At the start of the tournament, before any effort is exerted, the probability that agent i wins is
It follows that if the constraints e I i ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ {A, B}, do not bind, then the first-order conditions with respect to e I A and e I B can be written as:
The following proposition asserts that we can indeed use equations (F inal) and (Int) to find an equilibrium. Proposition 1. Given any disclosure policy (Z, ζ) , there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the game between the two agents that is induced by (Z, ζ) where
Proposition 1 shows that the intermediate and final effort levels as discussed in (Int) and (F inal) are in fact the best-response mapping of the agents given the disclosure policy of the principal. Thus the optimal disclosure policy of the principal is the one that corresponds to a point in the
mapping which maximizes the expected aggregate effort of the two agents. The next sections deals with this problem.
Optimal Disclosure Policy
This section analyzes the optimal choice of the disclosure policy. The first subsection presents the principal's problem and proves a number of results that make it more tractable.
The second subsection looks at the class of symmetric and deterministic disclosure policies and identifies the optimal policy in this class. The last subsection extends the analysis to all disclosure policies.
4.1.
Principal's Problem. The optimal disclosure policy solves:
The following two propositions make the problem more manageable.
Lemma 1.
If an optimal disclosure policy exists, then there exists an optimal disclosure policy with a finite Z.
Using the above lemma, we derive the following result.
Proposition 2.
If an optimal disclosure policy exists, then there exists an optimal disclosure policy with |Z| ≤ 6.
Note that since the final effort depends on the posteriors in a continuous way, it is not a priori obvious that we can restrict attention to disclosure policies with a finite number of signals. However, Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 assert that this is indeed true. The reason is that the only way the disclosure policy enters both the objective function and the constraints in the principal's problem is through the mathematical expectations of certain random variables (for example, effort), whose distribution is determined by the disclosure policy. However, if a probability distribution on some set has a certain expected value, it is possible to find a finite probability distribution on this set with the same expected value:
this is the intuition behind Lemma 1. Proposition 2 further bounds the power of the set Z by treating the principal's problem as a linear programming problem with nonnegativity constraints and determining the maximum number of choice variables in this problem that can take nonzero values at a corner solution.
Symmetric and Deterministic Disclosure Policies.
In this section, we are going to restrict attention to a certain class of disclosure policies (namely, deterministic and symmetric) and look for the optimal policy in this class. To better illustrate the trade-offs involved, we are first going to analyze in detail the case of α = 1 (that is, the case when the probability of success at each stage is equal to the effort level). The results of this analysis are summarized by Proposition 3.
First, let us define two restrictions on a disclosure policy.
Definition 2 means that the disclosure policy is treating the agents symmetrically ex ante:
if conditional on some signal z, P sf (z) = p, then there should exist a signal z 0 (possibly, but not necessarily, the same as z), such that P fs (z 0 ) = p. We consider it unreasonable to assume that z 0 should always be the same as z, because this requirement would rule out some interesting disclosure policies (for example, full disclosure). Symmetry is a reasonable requirement in practical applications. It implies that there exists a symmetric equilibrium where e F A = e F B and ∀z ∈ Z, ∃z 0 ∈ Z : e F A (z) = e F B (z 0 ) .
To illustrate the trade-offs involved in choosing the optimal disclosure policy, let us consider the case of α = 1 and look for the optimum in the class of symmetric deterministic disclosure policies. There are seven such policies:
3) Disclosing only if both succeed:
4) Disclosing only if both fail:
5) Disclosing whether the score is the same or not:
6) Disclosing whether the score is the same, and if it is the same, whether both succeed or fail:
Disclosing who is the leader if the score is not the same:
Comparison of these policies leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. When α = 1, the optimal disclosure policy in the class of symmetric deterministic disclosure policies is "disclosing only if both fail":
To understand the intuition behind the proposition, note first that the principal is facing a trade-off between intermediate and final effort: the policy that induces the highest intermediate effort ("disclose only if both fail") at the same time induces the lowest final effort.
In fact, the ranking of the disclosure policies with respect to final and intermediate effort are
almost the reverse of each other (with the policy of full disclosure as an exception).
To explain this trade-off, let us look at the final stage first. Note that the highest possible final-stage aggregate effort level (equal to 1) follows a signal that induces a posterior belief that with probability 1, either both agents succeed or both fail. In other words, the agents exert the most effort in the final stage if they know for sure that they are in equal position after the intermediate stage. 2 In contrast, when they know for sure that one of the agents This reasoning also suggests why the policy "disclose only if both succeed," which seems symmetric to "disclose only if both fail," does so much worse. The policy "disclose only if both succeed" sends a signal that leads to intensive final-stage competition (namely, signal We can now check whether Proposition 3 generalizes to the case of α ∈ [0, 1]. Table 4 in Appendix 2 shows the total effort as a function of α for the five disclosure policies considered above. Table 1 displays the total effort evaluated at different levels of α. Table 1 demonstrates that the ranking of disclosure policies in terms of total effort is the same for all values of α. In particular, the result that "disclose only if both fail" is the best policy is robust to changes in α. The same is shown in Figure 1 In this section, we extend our analysis to include all feasible disclosure policies (not only symmetric and deterministic) and search for the optimal policy in this class for different values of α. We find that "disclose only if both fail" remains optimal even if more general disclosure policies are allowed.
We resort to numerical analysis to solve problem (P) for different values of α. Proposition 2 allows us to restrict attention to disclosure policies with six signals (any disclosure policy with less than six signals can be represented as one with six signals, some of which have probability zero). The optimization problem boils down to a problem of choosing 26 variable showing the highest effort obtained by any symmetric deterministic disclosure policy for each value of α. The right column shows the highest total effort obtained from solving problem (P) numerically. One can observe that for α equal to 0.8 and 1, the optimal symmetric deterministic policy generates a higher effort level than the numerical solution to problem (P). When α equals 0.2, 0.4, or 0.6, the optimal symmetric deterministic disclosure policy generates lower effort, but the difference is negligible.
The fact that the two columns do not exactly match is due to the numerical nature of the reported solution to (P). Since the optimization routine in Matlab requires that the initial conditions must be feasible, it is not possible to use (Int) as a nonlinear equality constraint (it is rarely possible to draw a tuple ¡ e I A , e I B ¢ at random that satisfies (Int)). Instead, a measure of the "error" due to not exactly satisfying constraint (Int) is incorporated as a "penalty term" in the objective function. With this modification, the optimization routine can start with an arbitrary ¡ e I A , e I B ¢ value but converges at a point that "almost" satisfies the equality constraint. 3 Such approximation error is reflected in the discrepancy between the two columns in Table 2. 5. Discussion
Related Literature
There are several recent papers that consider the effect of information transmission on incentives in dynamic settings. The one that are closest to the present paper are Aoyagi model where the outcome is a sum of effort and a noise term (so that the outcome space at each stage is continuous) and thus arrives at a very different conclusion. In particular, in his model the optimal disclosure policy is highly sensitive to the sign of the third derivative of the cost function: if the third derivative is positive, full disclosure is optimal; if it is negative, no disclosure is optimal; if the cost function is quadratic, like in the present paper, then all disclosure policies induce the same effort. Another feature of his model is that the equilibrium first-stage effort does not depend on the disclosure policy. This is not the case in our model, and, although we consider only the quadratic cost function, we do not expect the optimal policy to depend on the sign of the third derivative of the cost function in such a dramatic way in our model. Ederer (2004) looks at only two disclosure policies, full disclosure and no disclosure, in a variety of settings that differ with respect to whether agents are characterized by privately observed ability levels and how an agent's output depends on his ability level.
He replicates the results of Aoyagi for the case of homogeneous ability, but shows that when ability is privately known and complementary to effort, then the two policies may generate different effort levels, and the comparison between them depends on the parameters.
Another related paper is Yildirim (2005), who considers a dynamic contest where the agents can decide after the intermediate stage whether to reveal the information about their 3 More precisely, in order to solve P0 : min
(where c is a scalar) we rewrite the objective function as
where λ is a positive real number. The term λ (g (x) − c) 2 represents the "penalty" for not satisfying the equality constraint. This is always positive by construction. Thus the solution to P1 must sufficiently minimize this penalty. Therefore, a solution to P1 is a reasonable approximation of the solution to P0 for a suitably chosen λ. We have used λ = 1000 for all equality constraints in our program. performance or not. In contrast to our paper, Yildirim assumes that the agents cannot commit to an information disclosure rule and considers only the two extreme revelation options: whether to reveal everything or to reveal nothing. He finds that in an asymmetric contest, all the information is revealed in equilibrium, but in an ex ante symmetric one, there is a continuum of equilibria with different revelation decisions that all lead to the same outcome. The assumption that the agents cannot commit to an information disclosure rule has also been considered in the patent race literature (for example, Gordon (2004) ) where the agents can also choose when to reveal the information. This paper is also related to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004) , who study how coarse should the optimal grading scheme be in tournaments where a participant's utility is directly determined by his net status (that is, the number of players with results below his minus the number of players with results above his). The main insight of the paper is that coarse grading schemes may generate better incentives than fine ones: for example, more effort can be induced if the continuum of outcomes is mapped into a few letter grades, and the participant's status is determined by the grade he gets, not by his exact outcome. Their results can be viewed as complementary to ours, since the force that drives their result is not the effect of information transmission, but the direct dependence of utility on status.
The question of optimal information transmission in a dynamic setting has also been studied in the context of a principal-agent model by Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico (2002). They find that, if the prize structure is held fixed, full disclosure generates more effort than no disclosure, but if the principal is also allowed to optimize with respect to the prize structure, no disclosure becomes optimal.
Possible Extensions
One could consider several possible extensions of the model. For instance, making the outcome dependent not only on effort, but also on ability, like in Ederer (2004), will likely change the optimal disclosure policy. In such a setting, intermediate output provides information not only about the relative standing, but also about the opponent's ability (and one's own ability as well in a career concerns -type model). This may strengthen the effect of disclosure on second-period competition. If the agents learn that they are close after the intermediate stage, they will compete even more intensively in the final stage, because this information also implies that their abilities are likely to be similar. In contrast, if they learn that they are far apart in the intermediate stage, this will imply that their abilities are likely to be disparate, which will dampen the incentives to compete in the final stage for both of them. The effect of introducing heterogeneous abilities on the optimal choice of the disclosure policy can thus go both ways.
Another potentially interesting extension is to allow the principal to choose how he wishes to aggregate the results of the two stages into the final score. In particular, the tie-breaking rule that we are using (split the prize in half if the sum of the results is equal for the two agents) may be suboptimal. We also cannot rule out the possibility that the optimal aggregation rule should give less (or more) weight to the intermediate result, or that an asymmetric tie-breaking rule that favors one agent over the other can generate more effort.
Indeed, the former possibility is suggested by Gershkov and Perry (2006) , who find that in a two-stage tournament, giving equal weight to intermediate and final result can generate less effort than only conducting a final review.
Finally, in most real-life dynamic tournaments,the principal can send private signals to participants, telling each competitor only how well he did, but not how well the others did.
Introducing private signals into the model would lead to substantial technical complications, but make the model more realistic.
Appendix 1: Proofs
We present the proofs omitted in the text in this section. Before we do so it is useful to present the following expressions as we will be using then in our proofs. First, using the law of total probability, equation (1) can be expanded as below:
As mentioned in the text, one can derive closed form solutions for the final effort levels. Finally, it is worthwhile to derive the exact form of the first order conditions that pin down the intermediate effort levels of the two agents. These conditions are:
Proof of Proposition 1. Given a disclosure policy (Z, ζ) , the game between agents has a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if there exist
and belong to [0, 1] .
First, let us prove that e
and 
¤ 2 , then:
Similarly,
Consequently,
follows that the function
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us change the choice variables in the following way:
(a) If for some z ∈ Z, ζ ff (z) > 0, then the Bayes rule defines a one-to-one correspondence
depends only on (P ss (z) , P f s (z) , P sf (z)). So for such z the principal can maximize with respect to
(b) If ζ ff (z) = 0 (which implies P ff (z) = 0) and ζ f s (z) > 0, then, similarly, the principal can maximize with respect to
(c) If ζ ff (z) = ζ f s (z) = 0 and ζ sf (z) > 0, then the principal can maximize with respect
So the principal can change the choice variables from (Z, ζ) to
, (ζ ss (z)) z:ζ ff (z)=ζ fs (z)=ζ sf (z)=0,ζ ss (z)>0 ) and add the constraints that P y A ,y B (z) ≥ 0 and P
be an equilibrium, and suppose that Z * is infinite. Then
will also be an equilibrium if (Int) holds ((F inal) will hold automatically, since we haven't changed P * z y i ,y j and e F * i (z)) and (2) e I * A + e I * B +
We will prove that there exist distributions ζ y i ,y j with a finite support such that (Int) , (2), (3) and (4) hold.
Take (Int), (2) and (4) (7 equations in total) and divide both sides by P
. The result will be 7 equations of the form the constant left-hand side lies in the convex hull of some set, the points of which are indexed by z ∈ Z." It follows that the left-hand side of (Int), (2) and (4) can be represented as a convex combination of points in this set, where the coefficients of the convex combination are of the form
, (ζ ss ) z:ζ ff (z)=ζ fs (z)=ζ sf (z)=0,ζ ss (z)>0f
or certain z ∈ Z. This convex combination defines a probability distribution concentrated on a finite number of points in Z. By Caratheodory's theorem, one can choose such a distribution so that it puts positive probability on not more than 8 points in Z (since we have 7 equations).
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1, there exists an optimal disclosure policy that puts positive probability on at most 8 signals in Z. Let the equilibrium generated by this optimal disclosure policy be
, and (4) . This is a linear programming problem, and the canonical form of this problem is
A is a 6 × 8 matrix (there are 6 constraints, two corresponding to (Int) and four to (6)), b is a 6 × 1 vector, and c is a 8 × 1 vector. If a solution to this problem exists, then there exists an extreme point of the feasible region that is optimal. At any extreme point, at most 6 coordinates of α are strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 3. Policy (5) and policy (7) generate the same efforts as policy (6) and policy (1) , respectively. This is because a signal z such that ζ ss (z) = ζ ff (z) = 1, ζ fs (z) = ζ sf (z) = 0 leads to the same final-stage effort as a signal z 0 such that ζ ss (z 0 ) = 1, ζ ff (z 0 ) = ζ sf (z 0 ) = ζ fs (z 0 ) = 0, or a signal z 00 such that ζ ff (z 00 ) = 1, ζ ss (z 00 ) = ζ sf (z 00 ) = ζ fs (z 00 ) = 0 (namely, the final-stage effort is 1 2 for both participants following any of these signals). Consequently, policy (5) generates the same final-stage efforts as policy (6) , and, consequently, the same intermediate-stage efforts, and the same is true for policies (7) and (1). In words, it does not matter whether only to disclose that the score is even, or to disclose the actual value of the score, given that it is even. So in effect, we have 5 different cases:
1) Full disclosure
Here P y A ,y B (z y A ,y B ) = 1, so substituting into the FOC for the final-stage effort yields
In a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions at the intermediate stage are:
The expected final stage effort is
With no disclosure, the two periods are symmetric, so e I A = e I B = e F A = e F B = e. Substituting into the first-order conditions for the final stage gives: (e(1−e)−e(1−e))
The expected total effort is
3) Disclosing only if both succeed
At the final stage, the effort after signal z 1 is
After signal z 2 , in a symmetric equilibrium the posteriors are
At the intermediate stage,
Substituting for e F (z 2 ) and reorganizing yields
The only solution that lies between 0 and 1 is
The second-order conditions are satisfied at this point, since (e
The resulting total effort is So e F A (z 2 ) = e F B (z 2 ) = e F (z 2 ) = 1 2 (P ss (z 2 ) + P f s (z 2 ) + P f f (z 2 )) = The resulting total effort is After signal z 2 , in a symmetric equilibrium the posteriors are P ff (z 2 ) = P ss (z 2 ) = 0,
The final-stage efforts after signal z 2 are e F A (z 2 ) = e F B (z 2 ) = e F (z 2 ) = 1 4 The resulting total effort is T E = 2e I + E z ¡ e Table 3 summarizes the equilibrium efforts. 
